Appeals to the Infallibility of the Ordinary Universal Magisterium: 1965-2002
Explicit claims to the infallibility of the ordinary universal magisterium first appeared in ecclesiastical documents in the 1863 apostolic letter of Pope Pius IX, Tuas libenter. That teaching was adapted at Vatican I and with a few exceptions 3 
Humanae Vitae
After Pope Paul VI's issuance of the encyclical, Humanae vitae, a number of theologians contended that the church's teaching on artificial contraception had met the conditions set forward in Lumen gentium no. 25 for the infallible exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium. One such claim came, rather unexpectedly, from Hans Küng. Küng proposed that the teaching on artificial contraception had indeed fulfilled the conditions established in Lumen gentium no. 25 for an infallible exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium. Küng's intention, however, was to show that since modern scholarship had persuasively demonstrated the error of this teaching, the church's teaching on infallibility itself must be rejected. 4 His argument, roundly criticized for its questionable assumptions, has been accepted by few theologians. A few years later John C. Ford and Germain Grisez published their much discussed study of the topic, concluding, with a quite different intention than that of Küng, that the The phrase, to be definitively held, is found in Lumen gentium no. 25.2, referring to the infallible teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium of bishops. Thus, while the word "infallible" was not found in the apostolic letter, the use of this phrase raised questions, for the pope was proposing a teaching "to be definitively held" in what appeared to be an exercise, not of the ordinary universal magisterium of the whole college of bishops, but of the ordinary papal magisterium. This assumption was confirmed in the subsequently published commentary of Cardinal Ratzinger. He wrote in L'Osservatore Romano:
In view of a magisterial text of the weight of the present Apostolic Letter, inevitably another question is raised: how binding is this document? It is explicitly stated that what is affirmed here must be definitively held in the Church, and that this question is no longer open to the interplay of differing opinions. Is this therefore an act of dogmatizing? Here one must answer that the Pope is not proposing any new dogmatic formula, but is confirming a certainty which has been constantly lived and held firm in the Church. In the technical language one should say: here we have an act of the ordinary Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiff, an act therefore which is not a solemn definition ex cathedra, even though in terms of content a doctrine is presented which is to be considered definitive. In other words, a certainty already existing in the Church, but now questioned by some, is confirmed by the Pope's apostolic authority. It has been given a concrete expression, which also puts in a binding form what has always been lived. Dubium: Whether the teaching that the Church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women, which is presented in the Apostolic Letter Ordinatio sacerdotalis to be held definitively, is to be understood as belonging to the deposit of faith.
Responsum: In the affirmative.
This teaching requires definitive assent, since, founded on the written Word of God, and from the beginning constantly preserved and applied in the Tradition of the Church, it has been set forth infallibly by the ordinary and universal Magisterium (cf. Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen gentium 25, 2). Thus, in the present circumstances, the Roman Pontiff, exercising his proper office of confirming the brethren (cf. Lk. 22:32), has handed on this same teaching by a formal declaration, explicitly stating what is to be held always, everywhere, and by all, as belonging to the deposit of the faith.
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As was the case with Ordinatio sacerdotalis, the Responsum ad dubium, far from squelching theological discussion of the topic, merely inflamed it.
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Evangelium Vitae
Earlier that same year, Pope John Paul II issued his encyclical, Evangelium vitae, in which he explicitly appealed to the authority of the ordinary universal magisterium in his condemnation of 1) the direct and voluntary killing of an innocent life, 2) abortion and 3)
euthanasia. According to the pope, the first was "reaffirmed by Sacred Scripture, transmitted by the Tradition of the church and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium." 14 The second and third teachings were both "based upon the natural law and upon the written Word of God, as transmitted by the Church's Tradition and taught by the ordinary and universal
Magisterium." 15 The official Vatican summary of the encyclical notes that in this encyclical the pope, "exercising his own magisterial authority… 'confirms'" a doctrine taught by the ordinary universal magisterium. 16 The formulations in this encyclical, when conjoined to the claims made by the CDF regarding papal teaching in Ordinatio sacerdotalis, have raised important questions, to be considered below, regarding the relationship between an exercise of the ordinary papal magisterium in "confirming" a teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium and the exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium itself.
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Ad Tuendam Fidem and the Ratzinger/Bertone Commentary
In the summer of 1998 the pope issued his apostolic letter, Ad tuendam fidem. 18 In this 19 In the Professio fidei three paragraphs were added to the NiceneConstantinopolitan Creed. The first paragraph referred to those teachings of the church which have been proposed as divinely revealed either by the solemn definition of pope or council or by the ordinary and universal magisterium. The second paragraph considered those teachings on faith and morals which have been "definitively proposed by the Church." The believer must "firmly accept and hold" these teachings as true. We will refer to these as definitive doctrines.
Finally, the third paragraph referred to those teachings which have been taught authoritatively but not infallibly by the magisterium. The believer is to adhere to these teachings with a "religious submission of intellect and will." We shall refer to these as authoritative, nondefinitive doctrines.
The intent of the papal letter was to address a legislative lacuna. While the current code already mentioned the first and third categories of church teaching and specified "just penalties"
to be imposed on those who dissent from these teachings, there was no mention in the code of the second category, definitive doctrine, and consequently, there was no mention of penalties for those who dissent from this second category. The prescribed "commas" corrected this lacuna. Of more significance for our topic was the commentary on the Professio fidei authored by Cardinal Ratzinger and Archbishop Bertone that accompanied the apostolic letter. While the commentary itself has no formal magisterial status, it is quite likely that it reflects the mind of the pope and leads one to interpret this emendation of canon law within a larger framework.
The commentary offers examples of definitive doctrines taught with the charism of infallibility:
the teaching on the illicitness of prostitution and fornication, Evangelium vitae's condemnation of euthanasia, the teaching that priestly ordination is reserved to men and Pope Leo XIII's declaration that Anglican orders were null and void. 20 None of the examples cited, however, would appear to be the result of solemn definitions but rather teachings proposed by the ordinary universal magisterium. 21 The inclusion of the teaching on Anglican orders drew the most attention and elicited widespread objections from ecumenists. Fr. Nugent returned to Rome a slightly amended form of the profession (e.g., substituting
"homosexual [genital] acts are always, objectively speaking, morally wrong" for "homosexual acts are always objectively evil") and a concluding paragraph which read:
Regarding difficulties in determining whether a particular teaching has in fact been taught infallibly by a nondefining act of the ordinary and universal magisterium (CIC 749.3) and while still acknowledging and affirming the authoritative and binding nature of such teaching, I will endeavor to maintain a positive attitude of prayer, study and ongoing communication with the Apostolic See on these matters.
The Vatican's response to this final emendation is pertinent:
While its precise meaning is not altogether clear, the reference to "difficulties in determining whether a particular teaching has in fact been taught infallibly by a non-defining act of the ordinary and universal magisterium," in the specific context of a Profession of Faith on the subject of homosexuality, can only be taken to mean that the author wishes to call into question the definitive status of doctrines regarding homosexuality belonging to the first and second paragraphs of the Professio fidei. The implication is that the status of doctrines of the first and second paragraphs is open to debate, thus, this addition contributes decisively to the inadequacy of his Response [italics in the original].
We will discuss the implications of this exchange between Nugent and the Vatican below.
This survey of contemporary claims to the infallibility of the ordinary universal magisterium after Vatican II and, in particular, during the pontificate of Pope John Paul II, while not comprehensive, should demonstrate the heightened significance given to this exercise of church teaching authority. A common characteristic of many of these claims to infallibility is that they concern church teachings that are disputed among reputable Catholic theologians. In the next section I will address some of the theological issues raised by this new development.
Unresolved Questions
While the dogmatic manuals popular in the period between the two Vatican councils dutifully addressed the ordinary universal magisterium, there was relatively little sustained theological reflection on this topic before Vatican II. This has changed dramatically in the last 25 years, largely because of the appeal to this exercise of episcopal teaching with respect to controversial matters. In this section I would like to review several theological issues raised by this expansive appeal to the ordinary universal magisterium.
What is the Precise Authoritative Status of the Teachings of the Ordinary Universal Magisterium?
When a truth of divine revelation is taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium, what results is, in effect, a "non-defined dogma." The fact that such dogmatic teachings are "definitive" yet "non-defined" invites the question whether such dogmas are to be granted the same status as "defined" dogmas. Or, put negatively, does the obstinate denial of a non-defined dogma constitute heresy as would be the case with a defined dogma? The code of canon law offers an affirmative answer. Canon 750 holds that "all that is proposed as divinely revealed either by the solemn magisterium of the Church or by its ordinary and universal magisterium, must be believed with divine and catholic faith." 23 In the following canon heresy is defined as "the obstinate post-baptismal denial of some truth which must be believed with divine and catholic faith…" It would follow from these two canons that if one obstinately denies a teaching proposed by the ordinary universal magisterium as a matter to "be believed with divine and catholic faith" they commit heresy. Francis Sullivan has argued from this conclusion that since the consequences for denying a non-defined dogma (the canonical penalties attached to the determination of heresy in canon 1364) are the same as those for denying a defined dogma, the principle articulated in canon 749 §3 that "no doctrine is understood to be infallibly defined unless it is clearly established as such" should be applied not only to defined dogmas, but to nondefined dogmas as well.
From the fact that the consequences for the faithful are the same whether doctrine has been solemnly defined or infallibly taught by the ordinary universal magisterium, I conclude that on theological grounds, the principle is equally true that no doctrine should be understood as having been infallibly proposed unless this fact is clearly established, whether the doctrine has been defined or taught by the ordinary universal magisterium. 24 Sullivan's approach, it would seem, is not to differentiate between defined and non-defined dogmas but to insist on the relatively high standard of manifestly establishing that a teaching has indeed been taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium.
Another line of thought, extending at least to the late nineteenth century, came to a somewhat different conclusion. J.M.A. Vacant published a rare monograph on the ordinary universal magisterium in 1887. In it he wrote that the teachings of the ordinary universal magisterium, although taught infallibly, could not be considered as dogmas of Catholic faith. He based this claim on his analysis of tradition. He could find no evidence of the negative theological note of heresy being attached to a teaching proposed only by the ordinary universal magisterium. He specifically mentions the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, the denial of which, in his view, had never been deemed a heresy prior to its formal definition even though it had presumably been taught by the ordinary universal magisterium.
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Some seventy years after Vacant, Karl Rahner and Karl Lehmann, in their essay on kerygma and dogma in Mysterium Salutis, also looked back at tradition and concluded that since the narrowing of the term "dogma" to its modern usage, there was a tendency to think of dogmas in terms of a solemn definition. 26 Rahner and Lehmann affirmed this tendency and noted the need to recognize the higher degree of certitude (Gewissheitsgrad) offered by defined dogmas.
Recently a canon lawyer, Kenneth Kaucheck, has come to the same conclusion:
While the ordinary magisterium possesses the same authority as solemn judgements, only a solemn judgement could define a teaching and only it determines that a teaching is actually heretical. Only in the denial of a defined proposition does one constitute oneself heretical. 27 I suspect that the differences between the viewpoint of Sullivan and that of Rahner/Lehmann are not as significant as first appears. Both viewpoints share a concern for the welfare of the faithful. Sullivan, by offering a stricter standard for acknowledging non-defined dogmas, and
Rahner/Lehmann by recognizing that in the tradition non-defined dogmas did not offer the same degree of certitude as defined dogmas, at least as regards the consequences for theological disagreement. Even if one grants the position that a defined dogma possesses a higher degree of certitude and that repudiation of a non-defined dogma would not constitute heresy, Sullivan's argument would still hold that there could be grave consequences for the faithful should a teaching be mistakenly held to be dogmatic.
Surely similar concerns for the consequences for the faithful hold not only for nondefined dogmas but also for definitive doctrines taught by the ordinary universal magisterium.
One of the most troubling aspects of the exchange between Fr. Nugent and the Vatican concerns the Vatican's unwillingness to accept Nugent's proviso regarding difficulties in determining whether a particular teaching has been taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium.
In his case (and, obviously, that of Sr. Gramick) the consequences were quite serious-his failure to sign the prescribed Professio fidei has resulted in severe restrictions being placed on his pastoral and theological activity. It is my contention that not only is Sullivan justified in expanding the scope of canon 749 §3 beyond defined dogmas to non-defined dogmas; its scope ought to also include definitive doctrine. Any claim to infallibility in formal church teaching, whether it is a matter of dogma or definitive doctrine, must be "clearly established" in order to avoid unwarranted and potentially harmful assertions of heresy or serious error and the canonical penalties that could follow.
Questions Regarding the Scope of the Object of the Ordinary Universal Magisterium
The relatively new category of church teaching considered in Ad tuendam fidem, definitive doctrine, yields a host of difficulties. 28 It is surely noteworthy that many of the recent claims made regarding the infallible exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium (e.g., the teaching on the ordination of women in Ordinatio sacerdotalis and the intrinsically evil character of homosexual acts included in the Professio fidei for Fr. Nugent) are concerned not with dogma but definitive doctrine. The expansion of such claims has been facilitated, in the minds of many, by a subtle re-interpretation of the scope of the category of definitive doctrine.
According to Jean-François Chiron, explicit claims to the exercise of the charism of infallibility with respect to non-revealed truths can be traced back to the seventeenth century Jansenist controversy in which the magisterium was presumed to be teaching infallibly, not only in its condemnation of the five heretical propositions held to be present in Cornelius Jansen's Augustinus, but also in its determination that these affirmations were, in fact, present in the work. While the judgment of heresy clearly concerned divine revelation, the judgment of fact did not. 29 The possibility of the exercise of infallibility with respect to non-revealed truths would be affirmed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century seminary manuals. After Vatican I, the explicit distinction between two objects of infallibility, the primary object corresponding to revealed truths and a secondary object corresponding to non-revealed truths, would become common in the manuals. In some cases the second category would be defined quite narrowly as those facts necessary to defend revelation, and in other instances quite broadly as facts merely "connected" to revelation. 30 Vatican I did not address the matter explicitly in its two constitutions. However, in the definition on papal infallibility, Pastor aeternus states that the pope defines "a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held (tenendam) by the whole church." 31 The use of tenendam rather than credendam suggests that the pope might teach infallibly on a matter not itself divinely revealed and therefore a matter not to be "believed" but "held." Bishop Gasser, in his relatio offered to the council, made explicit mention of the possibility of the church's infallibility extending to non-revealed truths, but presents these as truths taught infallibly only to the extent that they are necessary to safeguard divine revelation.
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Even so, both Gasser and the manualists after Vatican I were in agreement that the position that infallibility extended to non-revealed truths was not itself revealed but merely "theologically certain."
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While the documents of Vatican II do not treat this topic explicitly, Lumen gentium no.
25 states that the exercise of infallibility "extends just as far as the deposit of divine revelation that is to be guarded as sacred and faithfully expounded." The stress is clearly placed on divine revelation itself, as the extension of the object of infallibility is justified strictly in terms of safeguarding of revelation. 34 The council's Theological Commission took up this question explicitly, opting for a narrow scope for the secondary object, which it described as those teachings "required in order that the same deposit may be religiously safeguarded and faithfully expounded." 35 This interpretation was followed in a 1973 pronouncement of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. 36 In fact it is this narrow interpretation that, in substance, finds its way into the new clause that Pope John Paul II had inserted into the code as canon 750 §2:
"…each and every proposition required for the sacred preservation and faithful explanation of the same deposit of faith must be firmly embraced and maintained…" Verbum to effect a move away from this view of revelation and toward one which stressed the integral unity of divine revelation manifested not in a propositional statement but in a person, Jesus of Nazareth? 40 As one distinguished commentator on Dei Verbum observed:
The Council's intention in this matter was a simple one....The fathers were merely concerned with overcoming neo-scholastic intellectualism, for which revelation chiefly meant a store of mysterious supernatural teachings, which automatically reduces faith very much to an acceptance of these supernatural insights. As opposed to this, the Council desired to express again the character of revelation as a totality, in which word and event make up one whole, a true dialogue which touches man in his totality, not only challenging his reason, but, as dialogue, addressing him as a partner, indeed giving him his true nature for the first time. 41 It would appear that what we are seeing today with regard to this new category of definitive doctrines, is not unlike the neo-scholastic treatment of revealed truths criticized above.
The Problem of Verification
In a dogmatic manual the first edition of which was published decades before Vatican II, Timothy Zapelena warned of the difficulties involved in verifying the consensus of bishops in the teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium. 42 Today it is commonly recognized that one of the vexing features of the exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium arises because there is no clear defining act involved. This creates serious difficulties for verifying that a given teaching has, in fact, been taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium. The difficulties involved in this process of verification become even greater when one recognizes that the sought after episcopal consensus, past and present, cannot simply be a matter of tacit episcopal agreement on a particular teaching. Lumen gentium no. 25 holds that the bishops must be in agreement that "a particular teaching is to be held definitively (tamquam definitive tenendam)." This final clause suggests that there must be not only agreement among the bishops but an agreement that such a teaching is to be proposed irrevocabiliter. 43 We cannot exclude the possibility that the bishops might agree upon a given teaching but hold that it was, to use the language of the theological notes, only "theologically probable" and not a matter "to be held as definitive." But then, apart from explicit consultation of the bishops, how is the note they assign to a teaching to be ascertained? Sullivan suggests that "it is possible that some ordinary papal teaching, while not openly contradicted, might be given a rather passive reception or might even be qualified by a significant number of bishops." 44 Indeed, have there not been significant moments in church history when a bishop or bishops may have lacked the requisite experience or knowledge to give a teaching any more than this kind of passive acceptance? 45 Much more serious are the difficulties raised by the possibility of a consensus virtually coerced by papal directive. One can admit that the Vatican prohibition of free discussion among the bishops on a particular topic might be prudent in certain circumstances. However, when such a prohibition has been imposed, any subsequent claims to episcopal unanimity on that topic will inevitably be compromised as such unanimity will appear as little more than episcopal acquiescence to a Vatican directive.
It is possible to conceive of ecclesial processes that might demonstrate a genuine episcopal consensus. In the life of the early church collegial interaction was manifested in numerous ways: in participation in regional synods, in the distribution of circular letters, shared participation at episcopal ordinations, the sending and receiving of "letters of commendation,"
etc. In these many episcopal interactions, a common teaching was, often by fits and starts, nourished by the whole college. The common teaching depended on the support of episcopal communion. This explains the seriousness with which ecclesial schism was viewed; schism isolated one church from the larger communio ecclesiarum and deprived the isolated church of the particular witness of the other churches. Today there are alternative opportunities to build up the common teaching of the bishops; there is the collegiality manifested in the work of episcopal conferences, episcopal synods, the possibility (unfortunately, all too rarely employed) of plenary and provincial councils, etc. Yet the potential of these institutions to facilitate a growth in shared episcopal teaching has been severely compromised by an atmosphere created by the Vatican in which synodal agendas are carefully controlled, treatment of controversial topics in letters of episcopal conferences is discouraged and litmus tests are employed for episcopal appointment.
Bishops are told that they are not to voice publicly any disagreements they may have with current papal teaching. Such an atmosphere renders dubious any appeal to episcopal unanimity on certain controversial teachings in the face of evidence of widespread theological disagreement and private admissions of reservations on the part of many bishops.
Beyond the question of directly discerning episcopal consensus, Sullivan has also proposed two other criteria for discerning whether a teaching has been taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium: the consensus of theologians, and the consensus fidelium. He finds his first criterion in Pope Pius IX's Tuas Libenter, where the pope affirmed that an act of faith was due as well to those teachings proposed infallibly by the ordinary magisterium and "therefore are held by the universal and constant consent of Catholic theologians to pertain to the faith." Sullivan writes:
In this final clause, Pius IX is clearly proposing a criterion by which one can identify doctrines that have been taught by the ordinary universal magisterium as divinely revealed: there will be a universal and constant consensus among Catholic theologians that such doctrines are de fide. 46 Moreover, Sullivan emphasizes that such consensus must be constant. "This suggests that the kind of consensus by which we can conclude that a doctrine has been infallibly taught must be one that perseveres and remains firm." 47 Law. This canon refers to those teachings which are to be believed by "divine and catholic faith," whether proposed by a solemn definition or taught by the ordinary universal magisterium "which is manifested by the common adherence of Christ's faithful under the guidance of the sacred magisterium." In this clause, an addition to canon 1323 §1 of the old code, we find a rare reference to the ecclesiological notion of "reception of church teaching" by the faithful. 48 Here then, Sullivan suggests, is yet another way of verifying that a teaching has been infallibly proposed by the ordinary universal magisterium, the common adherence of the faithful.
Sullivan's attempt to develop a criteriology for the verification of the exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium has come under some criticism. In particular, Lawrence Welch has accused him of introducing sine qua non conditions for the exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium. 49 After a lengthy analysis of Sullivan's arguments, particularly as regards Pius IX's mention of the consensus of theologians, Welch writes:
But there is no reason to believe that this Pope [Pius IX], who insisted that theologians must subject themselves to the doctrinal decisions of the Roman Congregations, understood this to be not only a sign of, but a condition for definitive teachings whose absence would throw into doubt that the ordinary magisterium had taught a doctrine definitively. A sign is one thing, a condition is another. Sullivan seems to assume that sign and condition mean the same thing in this instance.
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As best as I can ascertain, however, Welch has misread Sullivan's argument, for nowhere does Sullivan assert that either criteria are necessary conditions for the exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium. Rather, he recognizes that there is an important distinction between a factual instance of universal episcopal teaching to be held as definitive by the faithful, and the verification that such a teaching has been so proposed. It is possible for a teaching to have been taught by the ordinary universal magisterium without that fact being readily evident at a given point in time.
This is why Sullivan's appeal to canon 749 §3 is crucial: "No doctrine is understood to be infallibly defined unless it is clearly established as such (Infallibiliter definita nulla intellegitur doctrina nisi id manifeste constiterit)." This canon is concerned not with establishing conditions for the de facto exercise of infallibility (as did Pastor Aeternus with respect to papal infallibility), but with the necessary verification that the exercise of infallibility has in fact taken place. Sullivan grants that the canon refers explicitly only to defined dogmas. However, he argues that it is theologically justifiable to extend the scope of the canon to non-defined dogmas.
As we saw above, Sullivan's primary argument is from the consequences to the faithful for denying such a dogma.
Germain Grisez has also challenged Sullivan's position on several counts. First, he questions whether, in canon 749 §3, constiterit ought to be translated as "established." Grisez holds that the Latin bears a different interpretation, namely that "one should not judge that this or that magisterial statement is a solemn definition unless the very formulation and its context makes this clear." 51 This canon then, is concerned strictly with the formulation of a dogmatic proposition. Since only solemn definitions have specific formulations, this canon could not be applied to non-defined dogmatic teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium. Curiously, Grisez does grant that in the case that he is arguing, that of the infallibility of the church's teaching on contraception, the faithful need respond to the teaching only as proposed authoritatively not infallibly.
For in view of the silence up to now of virtually all the bishops on the teaching's infallibility, as well as the absence of consensus among theologians who have dealt with the issue, most of the faithful who lack theological training will be unable to see that this teaching has been proposed infallibly. 52 Grisez would then appear to accept, in part, Sullivan's extension of canon 749 §3 to non-defined dogma, at least for the faithful, since, in the case of artificial contraception, the irreformability of this teaching would not have been clearly established for them. However, Grisez insists that the lack of consensus, significant for the faithful, does not hold the same significance for theologians themselves. "Psychologically, no doubt, it is reassuring to find one's views supported by many colleagues. Methodologically, however, this at best provides an unreliable sign of where the truth might lie." 53 But of course, the point of appealing to the consensus of theologians is to "clearly establish," not that a teaching is true, but rather that it has been taught infallibly by the ordinary universal magisterium. In this regard, establishing a consensus of theologians that a teaching has been proposed infallibly would seem equally important for theologians themselves as for the rest of the faithful.
Welch grants, against Grisez, Sullivan's translation of the canon, but still holds that the canon is concerned only with evaluating the formulation and context of a purported solemn definition. Thus the canon is concerned with "clearly establishing" that a purported solemn definition does indeed meet the conditions for the exercise of infallibility by either pope or council. "Surely canon 749 §3 cannot be applied in a straightforward way to undefined dogmas because they do not have the same precise formulation as defined dogmas and the same kind of identifiable context." 54 Still, Welch goes on to admit that "it remains true, of course, that when theologians try to identify undefined dogmas they must painstakingly inquire as to whether the Pope and the bishops have been in agreement that a particular doctrine must be held definitively." 55 It is not clear why "painstakingly inquiring" whether pope and bishops have proposed a teaching as definitive by the ordinary universal magisterium is not equivalent to inquiring into the intention of a pope or council to offer a solemn definition. That the former task is more difficult than the latter is precisely the reason Sullivan appeals to the importance of ascertaining a theological consensus.
I contend that the problem of verification emerges whenever there are appeals to the teaching of the ordinary universal magisterium with respect to currently disputed issues. When appeals to the ordinary universal magisterium are made with respect to longstanding affirmations of the kind found in the baptismal creeds regarding, for example, the communion of saints or the resurrection of the body, the question of verification rarely comes into play because these teachings are so evidently accepted as belonging to the apostolic faith. This may explain why, of all of the claims made in this present pontificate for the exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium, those made in Evangelium vitae have received the least criticism; while moral theologians will doubtless desire clarification regarding both the scope and the concrete application of the three condemnations found in that encyclical, there would appear to be a longstanding consensus on the general tenor of all three moral condemnations. However, claims made regarding both the prohibition of the ordination of women and the intrinsic evil of homosexual moral acts have raised significant questions precisely because many scholars believe that these teachings must be re-considered today in the light of fundamentally new interpretive frameworks. 56 I suggested some ten years ago that "in the face of controversy, the determination of the authoritative status of any teaching not solemnly defined can only be pursued tentatively….Where serious questions are leveled against a particular teaching of the church, appeals to the ordinary universal magisterium cannot be expected to resolve the matter." 57 Welch, in the article discussed above, took issue with my conclusion.
Suppose, for instance, that some time in the future the resurrection of the body became a controversial doctrine as it was in the early centuries. Would we really be justified in saying that its definitive and infallible status would only be tentative because it had become controversial? I would suggest that controversy or the lack of it is not really helpful in determining the definitive status of a doctrine taught by the ordinary universal magisterium. it is, in fact, very conceivable that the papal declaration could represent the end point of an intensive exchange between pope and episcopate: an exchange in which each bishop had an opportunity to make his views known. For, in the exercise of his responsibility as teacher, a bishop cannot be replaced either by the college of cardinals or by the presidents of the episcopal conferences. Such an exchange can be carried out in such a way that the existence of a synchronic consensus becomes evident to the faithful. 60 I believe Peter Hünermann has something of this in mind when he proposes a new paradigm for the exercise of papal teaching authority in which the pope functions as a kind of "notary public,"
formally affirming/witnessing the faith. 61 With this "notary" exercise of papal teaching the pope would be, not imposing a new teaching, but rather setting his "seal" on that which was has emerged in the consciousness of the church. The effectiveness of this confirmatory ministry would depend on its manifest character as confirmation rather than an autonomous determination. One would expect, for example, that such a confirming act might follow upon a direct consultation of the bishops. 62 An example of this kind of consultation is found in Evangelium vitae. In that encyclical the pope explicitly recounts his consultation by means of a personal letter addressed to every bishop. 63 Alternatively, there ought to be an obvious manifestation of an unbroken diachronic consensus of episcopal teaching in tradition that a teaching has consistently been proposed by the bishops as definitively to be held. there are serious questions among theologians as to whether a teaching has been so proposed by the bishops. In other words, however helpful a papal teaching act of confirmation might be, it cannot substitute for lack of evidence either that such a teaching has been consistently proclaimed in tradition or that such a teaching is, here and now, offered as a teaching to be held as definitive by the whole college of bishops. To adopt the image offered by Hünermann, a notary affixes a seal to a document, affirming that they have witnessed the proper signature of a document. The notary transcends their authority, however, when they affix their seal in the face of doubts regarding the authenticity of the signatory simply because they themselves are committed to the contents of the document.
The source of the difference between papal confirmation as conceived by
Pottmeyer/Hünermann and that conceived by Ferme is reflected in a statement Ferme makes early in his paper. In a discussion of the first two paragraphs of canon 749 he notes that these paragraphs address "two subjects of infallibility in the church," where paragraph one speaks of the first subject, the pope, and paragraph two speaks of the second subject, the college of bishops. 65 This view, however common it may have been in certain neo-scholastic manuals, represents a defective ecclesiological perspective. 66 Because the pope is the local bishop of Rome who, as such, functions as head of the college of bishops, he and the college can never be conceived as two distinct entities and two distinct (or as some manuals would say, "inadequately distinct") subjects. When Pottmeyer grants the legitimacy of an act of papal confirmation it is because he recognizes the role of the pope as head of the college within the college to sum up and give explicit expression to the sense of the college. Ferme's failure to acknowledge this ecclesiological reality leads him to give the papal confirmation of these purported episcopal teachings an autonomous value independent of any direct evidence of the bishops' teaching itself. Though it may be helpful, Ferme insists that the pope is under no obligation to "poll" the bishops; it is enough that "in a deliberate discernment of the faith of the Church the Pope declares this faith." 67 But if this is the case, since this papal confirmation is not, as Ferme admits, an infallible exercise, certain consequences follow. Most notably, the faithful may legitimately withhold assent from the pope's determination if after prayerful reflection and study they fail to see the connection between the papal confirmation and the witness of episcopal teaching.
Finally one should point out that this practice of papal confirmation risks obscuring what Bernard Sesboüé refers to as the fundamental "dissymmetry" intentionally preserved in the teaching of both Vatican I and II: while there are two modes of exercising the extraordinary magisterium (solemn judgment of an ecumenical council and the solemn judgment of the pope teaching ex cathedra) there is only one mode of exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium, the teaching of the whole college dispersed throughout the world. 68 The word "universal" was added to the passage in Dei filius precisely to make the point that the exercise of the ordinary magisterium that Pope Pius IX had in mind in Tuas Libenter was not an exercise of the ordinary papal magisterium. 69 Emphasis on the role of papal confirmation risks creating an unintended symmetry in which this exercise of the ordinary papal magisterium is transformed into a second, papal mode of exercising the ordinary universal magisterium.
Conclusion
In the early church it was commonly held that when the bishops proclaimed the apostolic kerygma, they did so in confidence that they were united with their brother bishops in the proclamation of the one faith in Jesus Christ. This daily preaching and teaching was the "ordinary" mode by which bishops exercised their authority as preachers and teachers.
Only when a proximate threat was raised against the received faith was it deemed necessary to "define" the faith in a more solemn fashion, initially by way of councils, and eventually by way of solemn papal judgments as well. In the years since the Second Vatican Council, this basic insight regarding the significance of the common teaching of the bishops exercised in their daily ministry has been transformed into a vehicle for addressing controversial matters. A disturbing trend has emerged in which the authoritative status of these disputed teachings has been elevated by appeal to this "third modality" for the exercise of infallibility. There is a real danger that a too far ranging appeal to the infallibility of the ordinary universal magisterium may foreshorten the necessary discourse of the whole Christian community on questions being posed in significantly new contexts and therefore not susceptible to "definitive" determinations.
Claims to the exercise of the ordinary universal magisterium have changed in significant ways. It is only in recovering the more ancient ecclesiological vision of the universal consensus of the churches and their bishops that the problematic features of this shift can be overcome. 21 The canonization of saints was also mentioned, though one might argue that if the practice of canonization involves an infallible teaching exercise (and I am not persuaded that it does), it would be as an exercise of the extraordinary papal magisterium. 22 The text of the profession of faith has not been made public, however its formal articulation of church teaching brings it into the church's public domain. Rev. Robert Nugent has provided the official text of the profession of faith and other Vatican correspondence and I cite this documentation with his permission. For background documentation see Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
